This paper investigates the secret key authentication capacity region. Specifically, the focus is on a model where a source must transmit information over an adversary controlled channel where the adversary, prior to the source's transmission, decides whether or not to replace the destination's observation with an arbitrary one of their choosing (done in hopes of having the destination accept a false message). To combat the adversary, the source and destination share a secret key which they may use to guarantee authenticated communications. The secret key authentication capacity region here is then defined as the region of jointly achievable message rate, authentication rate, and key consumption rate (i.e., how many bits of secret key are needed). This is the second of a two part study, with the studies separated by how the authentication rate is measured.
private from the adversary prior to transmission. For Ahlswede, allowing this secret key dramatically improved the communication rate, essentially transforming AVCs into a compound channel.
While these papers do examine an aspect of authentication, one can also argue that they are much too strict in their operational requirement. Today, the detection of the adversaries involvement is a strong enough result for many fields of security; for example, in quantum key distribution a system is considered operational even though the adversary can reduce the key rate to zero by measuring the data. In our case, it makes even more practical sense to forgo such a harsh operational requirement. That is, if an adversary wanted to reduce the communication rate to zero between two parties in practice, they would simply need a strong enough jammer. Of course, simply jamming a signal is different than trying to have a node accept a fabricated message as authentic. This is the stance we adopt here: when the adversary is attacking, a system is operational if it can decode the correct message or detect the attack; when the adversary is not attacking, we want the system to communicate as much data as possible.
Adopting this viewpoint, works by Jiang [11] , [12] , Graves et al. [13] , Kosut and Kliewer [14] , and Beemer et al. [15] all consider authentication over an AVC without a secret key. In particular, Jiang considered the sub-case of AVC where the output of the AVC was independent of the legitimate parties input for all but a single channel state. Graves et al. considered a general AVC where the adversary is given the side information of which message is being transmitted, while Kosut and Kliewer considered the general AVC case. Finally, Beemer et al. considered a binary AVC, where the adversary is allowed to observe the source's transmission through a noisy channel before choosing the channel state. Each of these works avoids looking at the strength of the authentication capability, and instead only considers the data rate given the maximum probability of false authentication goes to zero.
Works considering secret key-based authentication have their genesis in Simmons [16] , who considered a special case of the model presented here where all channels are noiseless. The fundamental distinction separating the problems of keyless and secret key authentication is that the former relies on exploiting nature of the communication channels, while the latter relies on exploiting a finite resource. Later came the works of Lai et al. [1] and that of Gungor and Koksal [2] , who both consider generalizations of Simmons' model with noisy channels. Each of these works has aspects which could be strengthened. Lai et al. require the amount of secret key bits to be asymptotically negligible when compared with the blocklength of the transmission. In doing so, though, they can make no distinction in the importance of verifying ten versus ten thousand bits of data. Meanwhile, Gungor and Koksal's coding scheme is inefficient and mismanages the key by unnecessarily using it in a way that favors the adversary. Furthermore, their work does not attempt 1 to explicitly derive such a region, instead opting for a presentation of error exponents.
Once again, for this paper, we look to characterize the trade-off between information rate, strength of authentication, and the amount of required key. In this setting, with our new typical authentication rate metric, we are able to derive a matching inner and outer bound, thus completely characterizing the region. For the inner bound, we will use a coding scheme similar to that of Part I. On the other hand, for the converse, we use results from Graves and Wong [17] which allow us to directly turn the operational requirement of authenticity into bounds on mutual information terms.
We conclude this introduction by presenting the notation that will be used throughout the paper in Section I-A.
Following this, we shall present the exact channel model, and its relevant definitions in Section II. Section III, then, revisits past work on this model, describing the works of [1] , [16] , and [17] in more detail as we believe understanding the past schemes will allow for a better understanding of our approach. We will also describe the results of Csiszár and Körner [18] on the discrete memoryless broadcast channel with confidential communications, which will provide the basis for our direct scheme. Fundamental results are then presented in Section IV, and examples of given in Section V. Proofs can be found in appendices.
A. Notation
Uppercase letters will be used to denote random variables (RVs) and lowercase letters will be used to denote constants. The probability of event A is denoted Pr(A). Function p with subscript RV will be used to denote the probability distribution over the RV (i.e., p X (x) = Pr(X = x)). To simplify presentation, the subscript may be suppressed when clear. Calligraphic font or curly brackets will be used to denote sets, for instance Y = {1, . . . , 10}.
The only exceptions to this are the set of positive real numbers, denoted R + , and the set of positive integers, denoted Z + . Subscripts will generally be used for bookkeeping purposes. While | denotes the word "given," and : "subject to."
The function × will be used to denote the Cartesian product. We will frequently need to use the Cartesian product of n (where n will denote the block length of a given code) correlated RVs, constants, and sets. This need arises so frequently that we denote these Cartesian products by bold face. For instance, X = × n i=1 X i = (X 1 , . . . , X n ) and X = × n i=1 X . When using this notation with a probability distribution the terms in the product are uncorrelated. For example, given a probability distribution p X over X
for each x ∈ X .
The indicator function of an event A is denoted 1 {A}, that is 1 {A} = 1 if A occurs, otherwise 1 {A} = 0.
The set of all probability distributions on a certain set, say X , is denoted by P(X ), likewise P(Y|X ) denotes the probability distributions of Y conditioned on elements of X . The set P(Y X ) represents a special subset of
Another special subset of the distributions is the possible "empirical distributions" (or type classes) for a given n-length sequence, denoted P n (·). The empirical distribution of sequence x, denoted p x , is the distribution defined by the proportion of occurrences of x in sequence x. In other words,
This follows similarly for empirical conditional distributions, but we further list the empirical distribution of the conditioning value, such as P n (Y|X ; ρ) for ρ ∈ P n (X ). Here, the empirical conditional distribution of y given x is defined by
For each µ ∈ P n (Y|X ; ρ) and ρ ∈ P n (X ), the type class of µ given a x such that p x = ρ is denoted
Black board bold (other than the two exceptions discussed earlier) is used to denote functions which are averaged over RVs. Of particular importance is E which denotes the expectation operator. Other important functions are entropy and mutual information denoted (respectively) by
for discrete random variables X, Y , and U .
In addition to the traditional absolute value, for any a ∈ Z, a ∈ R n , and set A ⊆ X define the following:
Finally, the O function from the Bachmann-Landau notation will be employed here. That is, by writing g(x, n) = f (x, O(h(n))), we are saying that there exists a constant such ζ, independent of n, such that
f (x, r).
II. MODEL
In this communication model (pictured in Figure 1 ), Alice wishes to send a message M , uniformly distributed on M = {1, . . . , 2 nr } with n ∈ Z + and r ∈ R + , to Bob over a (to be defined later) discrete memoryless-adversarial Alice and Bob share a secret key, K, chosen uniformly over K {1, . . . , 2 nκ }, where κ ∈ R + . For simplicity, we assume that 2 nr ∈ Z + and 2 nκ ∈ Z + . To transmit this message, Alice uses an encoder that selects an n-symbol channel input sequence X as a (possibly stochastic) function of the message M and key K. Throughout this paper, f ∈ P(X |M, K) will be used to denote the stochastic relationship between the encoder's channel input sequence given the message and secret key.
On the other end, Bob uses a decoder to estimate the message as a function of the channel's output sequence, either Y orŶ, and the shared key. The "!" symbol is to be representative of the decoder declaring their observation is inauthentic. Similar to the encoder, the decoder will be identified by a conditional probability distribution ϕ ∈ P(M ∪ {!}|Y, K).
We now return to the discrete memoryless-adversarial interlope channel(p Y |X , p Z|X ). If Gríma chooses his own sequence for the channel to output, it will be called interloping, andŶ will denote the channel's output sequence.
When interloping, Gríma may arbitrarily choose the value ofŶ as a function of his own observation Z, where the probability that Z = z|{X = x} is p Z|X (z|x) = n i=1 p Z|X (z i |x i ). Thus, when Gríma interlopes, we shall make the assumption that the probabilityŶ =ŷ|{Z = z} is ψ(y|z) for some ψ ∈ P(Y|Z). In general, it should be assumed that ψ ∈ P(Y|Z) will be chosen to minimize the authentication measure (to be discussed more later). On the other hand, when Gríma does not interlope, Y will denote the channel's output sequence, where specifically the
. Note this channel is not a true memoryless channel since Gríma does not need to act in a memoryless fashion on the symbols. Instead, the p Y |X and p Z|X in a DM-AIC(p Y |X , p Z|X ) only specify the memoryless channels that connect Alice to Bob (if Gríma does not interlope) and Alice to Gríma, respectively.
A. Operational Definitions
For this part of the study, we adopt the typical authentication rate, for a given authentication failure tolerance.
Definition 1.
A code (f, ϕ) has typical authentication rate α and authentication failure tolerance if sup a ∈ R + : sup
Recall from Part I of this study, ω f,ϕ (z, m, k) can be interpreted as the probability of false authentication given Gríma observed z, the true message is m, and the key is k. In that sense, a code with a typical authentication rate of α with an authentication failure tolerance of guarantees that, with probability at least 1 − , Gríma's observed sequence only provides Gríma with a 2 −nα probability to fool Bob into authentication. In comparison, average authentication is the probability of false authentication, averaged over all possible observations by Gríma. Thus, the typical authentication rate is a measure of Gríma's ability to falsely inject a message, as long as the channel behaves as expected.
Moreover, the authentication failure tolerance acts as a measure of channel deviation in the same way as the final operational definition, the probability of message error.
Definition 2. The probability of message error is
Remark Neither the authentication failure tolerance or the probability of message error is measured per transmitted symbol.
Combining these operational parameters, we define the following code measure.
blocklength n, message rate at least r, typical authentication rate at least α, key consumption rate at most κ, and both probability of message error and authentication failure tolerance less than δ.
The goal of this work is to determine the inherent trade-offs between the message rate, authentication rate, and key consumption rate, when the probability of message error and authentication failure tolerance go to zero. Note that requiring the authentication failure tolerance go to zero yields codes for which almost surely the probability of false authentication will have an upper bound of exp(−(n) authentication rate). As with the average authentication capacity region, the typical authentication capacity region is defined as a limit point of the operational measures as the blocklength goes to infinity.
The set C TA (p Y |X , p Z|X ) is called the typical authentication capacity region.
Remark This region is, once again, closed (but not necessarily convex) by definition.
Remark The values of r = 0 are excluded from this region, since these codes transmit asymptotically 0 information per symbol. Furthermore, eliminating the case where r = 0 yields a C TA (p Y |X , p Z|X ) that is convex. If, instead, we were to allow r = 0, then the new value C TA (p Y |X , p Z|X ) would simply be the union of the region presented in our results, and the set of (0, a, b) for all non-negative real numbers a and b. Indeed, consider the case where there is only a single message to transmit. In this case it would be impossible for Gríma to replace it with an alternative, and thus provide an infinite authentication rate, without consuming any key. Therefore, the case of r = 0 is not really interesting in our context.
III. BACKGROUND
For the reader's convenience, we shall briefly describe the coding schemes of Lai et al. [1] and Simmons [16] .
While our coding scheme is novel in the sense that it has not previously appeared, it does share a design philosophy with Lai et al. and with Simmons. These schemes separate in an intuitive way, with Lai et al.'s scheme exploiting the channel for authenticity and Simmon's scheme exploiting only the secret key for authenticity. In addition to these coding schemes, it will be helpful to further discuss codes for the discrete broadcast channel with confidential communications (DM-BCCC), from [19, Theorem 17.13] . Codes for the DM-BCCC will act as a base code to with which we can use Lai's strategy (although not his direct coding scheme).
For the converse, it will be helpful to briefly discuss information stabilizing random variables, introduced by Graves and Wong [17] . These constructed random variables will provide us with a method by which to turn the operational requirements for authentication into requirements on information terms similar to how Fano's inequality turns the requirement for a small probability of error into a requirement on a conditional entropy.
A. Lai's Strategy
Lai et al. [1] used the strategy of having Alice explicitly send the value of the secret key to Bob, while simultaneously obfuscating this value from Gríma. Since it will be of direct use here, we explicitly define Lai's strategy as follows.
Definition 5.
A code (f, ϕ) uses Lai's strategy if:
• for each y ∈ Y there is at most one value of k ∈ K such that ϕ(M|y, k) > 0,
With this strategy, each of Bob's possible observed sequence can only correspond to a single key. Hence, any attempt to interlope would require Gríma to select an observation corresponding to the secret key shared between Alice and Bob. To that end, by Alice transmitting the value of the secret key in a way which obfuscates its value from Gríma, she ensures that Gríma's probability of determining which secret key is being used remains small.
For the specific code, Lai et al. [1] used a modified wiretap coding scheme where, in particular, they first chose an integer n and distribution ρ ∈ P n (X ) such that for X ∼ ρ(x)
Next, they randomly and independently selected approximately 2 nI(Y ;X) codewords from the type set of T ρ . These codewords were then placed into one of 2 n[I(Y ;X)−I(Z;X)] bins at random, giving approximately 2 nI(Z;X) codewords per bin. Each of these bins were then associated with a particular key, and each codeword in the bin was assigned a message. Because the capacity of the channel from Alice to Gríma was entirely exhausted sending the information about the message given the secret key, the secret key remained obscured from Gríma and yet still correlated with the message.
While one of our coding schemes will rely on Lai's strategy, as stated in Definition 5, we will not limit ourselves to their their coding scheme. Instead, we shall use a general code for the DM-BCCC which we describe in greater detail in Section III-C.
B. Simmons' strategy
Simmons [16] considered this problem where all channels were noiseless. Simmons' strategy, specifically, was to associate each key k ∈ {1, . . . , 2 nκ } with an independently and randomly chosen subset X (k) ⊂ X where |X (k)| = 2 −nκ/2 |X | = |M|.
For each m ∈ M and k, Alice chooses a unique x ∈ X (k) to represent the message. Hence, the message rate is
On the other hand, consider the scenario where Gríma observes x and replaces it with x = x. Having observed
x, Gríma can narrow down the value of the key (since not all X (k) contain x) and use this information in the selection of x . On average, there should be |K| (|X (k)| / |X |) 2 = 1 value of k such that X (k) contain both x and
x . At the same time, there will be on average |K| (|X (k)| / |X |) = 2 nκ/2 values of k such that X (k) contains x.
Hence, on average Gríma should only have a 2 −nκ/2 chance of selecting a x which is actually valid for the given secret key.
C. Broadcast channel with confidential communications
Optimal codes for the DM-BCC(p Y |X , p Z|X ) channel were first determined by Csiszár and Körner [18] , and later improved by the same authors [19, Chapter 17] . We describe what appears in [19, Chapter 17] . Formally, a
where Gríma is forced to select Alice's transmission.
That is, Alice's transmits sequence X, and Bob receives sequence
For the DM-BCCC(p Y |X , p Z|X ), though, Alice is attempting to send three different messages (M 0 , M 1 , M s ), each with unique requirements. To wit, message M 0 will need to be reliably decoded by both Bob and Gríma, message M 1 reliably decoded by only Bob, and message M s reliably decoded by Bob but also kept secret from Gríma. Our direct results will show codes of this type, when used with Lai's strategy, naturally provide good authentication codes. Because of this, the following more formal definition 3 will be of use.
is a (r 0 , r 1 , r s , , n) code for the DM-BCCC(p Y |X , p Z|X ) if the following are satisfied
Under these definitions, Csiszár and Körner proved the following theorem [19, Theorem 17.13] . 
for some RVs U and W such that |U| ≤ (|X | + 1)(|X | + 3), |W| ≤ |X | + 3, and W c U c X c (Y, Z). 3 Csiszár and Körner leave the formal definition up to the reader. These formal error definitions can be directly inferred from their code construction, which relies on [19, Lemma 17.14] , while the deterministic decoder requirement and leakage requirement are easily inferred as consequences of [19, Theorem 17.13] being an extension of a simpler problem whose requirements are defined in [19, Definition 17.10 ].
As will be shown later, a code for the DM-BCCC(p Y |X , p Z|X ), where K is transmitted using M s and M is transmitted using M 1 naturally provides a coding scheme which satisfies Lai's strategy (see Definition 5) . By having Alice send the secret key with the secret message, Bob can decode the transmitted value and check against his own copy of the secret key to determine validity. At the same time, Gríma will not be able to gain much information about the secret key since M s is designed to be secret. Thus, Gríma's probability of intruding in the system should be around 2 −nκ since he gained no information about the key, and at the same time each of Bob's observations, which Gríma may choose, correspond to only a single key.
To conclude this section, we simplify the region in Theorem 8 for triples of the form (0, r 1 , r s ). Such a step is prudent since, for our purposes, there is nothing to be gained by designing our coding scheme around transmission of a message that Gríma can decode.
Corollary 9. The triple (0, r 1 , r s ) is achievable if and only if
for some U and W such that |U| ≤ (|X |+1)(|X |+3), |W| ≤ |X |+3, and W c U c X c (Y, Z), by Theorem 8.
To prove the corollary, we must demonstrate that R = R , where R is the set of (r 1 , r s ) such that 
D. Information stabilizing random variables
Converse proofs will rely heavily on [17, Corollary 17] . This result is hard to parse due to it's generality, so for presentation purposes, we specialize to the model at hand and have made all error terms equal. exists RV T such that:
where λ n = O(n − 1 2|X | max(|Y|,|Z|)+2 log 2 n) and D + is the set of (y, z, m, k, t) such that
Remark Furthermore, we will write statements of the form (y, m, k, t) ∈ D + in lieu of defining a new set, saỹ D + , that consists of all (y, m, k, t) such that
To this end, if we were to defineD + as above then
since if there exists a z such that (y, z, m, k, t) ∈ D + , then (y, m, k, t) ∈D + . Defining a new stabilizing set, such asD + above, would require us introduce notation for each of the 15 possible non empty substring of (y, z, m, k, t)
that include t (i.e., (y, z, m, t), (y, z, k, t), and so on). Instead, we emphasize the recursive nature of this result here, and opt for using a single D + , considering it the stabilized set.
These properties will be useful in constructing information theoretic necessary conditions from authentication, acting as a general Fano's inequality. That is, where Fano's inequality uses the probability of error to derive a bound on conditional entropy, these properties will allow us to establish requirements on associated information terms using the systems requirements for authentication. To give an example of how these properties may be used, we conclude this section by demonstrating how to derive
whereλ n = 3λ n − 1 n log 2 (1 − − 2 −nλn ), for any code that satisfies
From Equation (4) it can be further shown that
by using the chain rule for mutual information, and that conditional entropy is always strictly less than the unconditional entropy, and then making use of since (T, M ) c X c (Y, Z). Equation (5), where the error term is replaced with one linearly dependent upon probability of error , can easily be derived starting from Fano's inequality (see, for example, [20, Section 7.9]); the derivation here is intended simply to provide an example of how the information stabilizing random variable can produce information theoretic necessary requirements.
Using the properties of the information stabilizing random variable T , Equation (4) 
where (6) is the law of total probability; (7) is because of Equation (3) and because ϕ is a probability distribution; (8) is Bayes' Theorem; (9) is because
for all (y, m, k, t) ∈ D + ; (10) is by recognizing that 2 −nr+I(Y;M |T =t)+3nλn is not dependent upon m, k or y;
and (11) is because the maximum is greater than the average.
IV. MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS
Our major contribution, Theorem 14, is the characterization of the typical authentication capacity region. Before presenting this result, it will be helpful to first present a number of intermediary results and explain their relevance. This is true for both the direct result (that a particular set of (r, α, κ) can be achieved) and the converse result (that only these (r, α, κ) can be achieved).
We start with the direct results where we shall show that all (r, α, κ) ∈ C TA (p Y |X , p Z|X ) can be achieved using the composition of two codes. In particular, these two codes are distinct in the method by which they exploit the secret key to generate authentication rate. For the first code, the authentication rate will be derived from the ability of Alice to send secure information over the channel. The second code, on the other hand, will derive the authentication rate by exploiting Alice and Bob's shared resource (the secret key) in such a way that is insensitive to the channel. Thus, these two direct codes can, in some abstract sense, be thought of as a code to exploit the security of the channel and a code to exploit the security of the source.
For the code that exploits the security of the channel, we opt to use a DM-BCCC(p Y |X , p Z|X ) code in conjunction with Lai's strategy. Doing so leads to the following inner bound on the typical authentication capacity region,
Theorem 11. For positive real numbers r, α, κ if Of interest to note, here, is that using the DM-BCCC code with Lai's strategy requires there to be a trade-off between the authentication rate and the message rate, since more bits being used for the secret message means less bits for the non-secret message. This is reflected in the upper bound on the sum of message rate and authentication rate.
See Appendix
For the second coding scheme, we will exploit the shared resource, i.e. the secret key, independently of the channel. In particular, we modify Simmons' [16] coding scheme into a universally composable code.
for all non-negative β < r.
See Appendix B for proof.
Practically, one may think of the coding scheme which accomplishes the above rate region as follows. Given a starting code, take nβ-bits assigned to transmitting the message and reallocate them for authentication. Next, independently for each n(r − β)-bit message, randomly choose an isomorphic nβ to nβ-bit mapping. Now, for communication, apply the appropriate isomorphic mapping to the first nβ bits of additional secret key and add to the result (bitwise modulo 2) the remaining nβ bits of additional secret key. The nβ-bit sequence that results from the addition is then sent using the nβ reallocated for the purpose of authentication. This addition acts as a Clearly, this type of code sacrifices message rate and key consumption rate in order to increase the authentication rate. In particular, an increase of β in the authentication rate requires an increase of 2β in the key consumption rate. Intuitively, two bits of secret key are consumed for every one bit of authentication needed. This differs from Theorem 11 where α = κ up to a given threshold. On the other hand, similar to Theorem 11, the authentication rate and the message rate satisfy a linear relationship. That is, the sum of the message rate and authentication rate is preserved.
These results are sufficient to establish the direct portion of C TA (p Y |X , p Z|X ), thus we move on to results which support the converse. For the converse, the following intermediary result is needed.
Lemma 13. There exists a function ζ :
for all (r, α, κ, , n)-TA codes for DM-AIC(p Y |X , p Z|X ). 
Lemma 13, therefore, extends these previous conclusions to the strictly not smaller set of typically achievable (r, α, κ). This is somewhat unfortunate, though, as Lemma 13 will provide asymptotically tight bounds (as shown by the upcoming Theorem 14) . Hence, if the average authentication region is in general a strict subset of the typical authentication region (which we conjecture), then it follows that (13) is loose.
These preceding results, plus classic well known techniques (essentially Fourier-Motzkin elimination, Csiszár sum identity, and Fenchel-Eggleston-Carathéodory theorem), combine to prove the main theorem.
Theorem 14. The typical authentication capacity region, C TA (p Y |X , p Z|X ), is the set of (r, α, κ) such that
for some random variables X, U, W such that W c U c X c (Y, Z) and |U| = (|X | + 2)(|X | + 1) and |W| = |X | + 2.
See Appendix D for proof.
Fixing a W, U, X, the resulting region is best viewed in terms of the cost of authentication. Specifically, there exists a threshold 4 (I(Y ; U |W ) − I(Z; U |W )) below which every bit of authentication costs one bit of message rate and one bit of key consumption rate. Above this threshold, every bit of authentication costs one bit of message rate and two bits of key consumption rate until no message rate remains. It is not surprising that authentication rate requires key consumption rate, more interesting is that authentication and message rate are actually a shared resource.
Of course, by allowing W, U, X to vary means that these trade-offs may not be necessarily true depending on the exact message rate, authentication rate, and key consumption rate. An important threshold in this regards is the threshold for bits of authentication below which it is possible to achieve the max sum of message and authentication rate and still have the authentication rate equal to the key consumption rate. Specifically, this value is
where the distribution of X maximizes I(Y ; X). Alternatively, in environments where maximizing the authentication and message rates is critical, this threshold represents the point at which further bits of authentication cost twice as much in key consumption. Regardless, this threshold represents where authentication rate costs the least to achieve.
Finally, it is important to note that the fact that authentication rate and message rate share a finite resource must also hold true under the average authentication metric. Indeed, obviously if (r, α, κ) ∈ C AA (p Y |X , p Z|X ), then (r, α, κ) ∈ C TA (p Y |X , p Z|X ). Furthermore, as Part I demonstrated, the sum of message rate and authentication rate can equal the channel's capacity under the average authentication metric. Therefore, it must follow that, even under the average authentication measure, increasing the authentication rate past a given threshold must also decrease the message rate.
V. EXAMPLES
We now provide some numerical examples in order to illustrate the trade-offs between the three parameters that make up the typical authentication capacity region. The case where both p Y |X and p Z|X are binary symmetric
We shall use λ t throughout this section to represent the BSC parameter of p Y |X and λ q to represent the BSC parameter of p Z|X .
Since both channels are BSC, the channel with the larger λ value will be stochastically degraded with respect to the channel with the smaller λ. In the case that λ t ≤ λ q , then I(Y ; W ) ≥ I(Z; W ) and I(Y ; X|W ) ≥ I(Z; X|W )
for all W c X c (Y, Z) by the data processing inequality, hence the region dictated by Theorem 14 can be simplified to
On the other hand, when λ q ≤ λ t , this same property simplifies the region to
Three different plots are annotated to illustrate various considerations for the region, including the trade-off between message rate and typical authentication, the efficiency of consumed key material, and the effects of main channel quality including both the more noisy and less noisy regimes.
A significant result present in both capacity regions of Theorem 11 and Theorem 14 is that communication and authentication must share the main channel capacity. Fig. 2 depicts the trade-off for both the more noisy and less noisy channel cases. The linear trade-off between r and α is ultimately limited by the channel or key rate. In the first less noisy case, α is limited by the secrecy capacity of the channel pair, while in the second case, it is limited by the amount of key available since κ = .3 is less than the secrecy capacity of the channel. Finally when the main channel is more noisy, α is limited by half the key κ/2. The ability to achieve a nonzero authentication rate in such cases is due to the incorporation of Simmons' noiseless strategy in our code, unlike Lai's region (Theorem 11) where no authentication is possible. The region is clearly improved when secrecy capacity is available and there is enough key material to take full advantage of it.
With that in mind, we next explore how efficient key use is in terms of the amount of authentication rate achieved by each additional bit of key for a few different scenarios. Key consumption is most efficient when secrecy capacity is available and used fully. In other words, as much key as possible should be sent using the secrecy provided by the channel rather than by Simmons' strategy. In fact, using secrecy capacity is twice as efficient, as depicted in Fig. 3 . The two less noisy cases show that each bit of key increases the authentication rate the same amount.
However, once the secrecy capacity has been depleted, the effect of each additional bit of key is halved since the less efficient Simmons' scheme must be used instead. For a more noisy main channel, no secrecy capacity is available, so only Simmons' strategy is used, maintaining a constant efficiency of 1/2 for all key consumption rates.
Ultimately, though, authentication in all cases is limited by the main channel capacity and desired message rate.
Next, the effect of main channel quality on the amount of authentication possible for different key consumption rates is shown in Fig. 4 . As one would expect, lower authentication rates are achievable for decreasing main channel in Appendix A-C, we use these transformed codes in conjunction with Corollary 9 to prove Theorem 11.
A. Key features of Lai's Strategy
The first major benefit of using Lai's strategy is that it simplifies ω f,ϕ . Indeed, by ensuring that for each y there is at most a single k such that ϕ(!|y, k) = 1 it forces Gríma to know the exact value of k to interlope. Proof: This first part of the lemma follows near immediately from definitions,
where the last line follows because ϕ is deterministic from Lai's Strategy.
Next, to prove thatψ is a valid probability distribution, we must show that k∈{K,!}ψ (k|z) = 1 for all z. 
where Equation (21) is because Lai's Strategy requires that there is one, and only one, value of a ∈ {M, !} such that ϕ(a|y, k) = 1 for each y and k, proving the assertion.
Another benefit of Lai's Strategy is that the information about the key is sent privately. In fact, keeping the mutual information allows for use of the following lemma. Proof: Let Q be the set of (a, b) such that p(a|b) > p(a)2 nc , furthermore letŜ be the subset of (a, b) such that (a, b) / ∈ Q and p(a|b) ≥ p(a), andS be the subset of (a, b) / ∈ Q such that p(a|b) < p(a). Note that is a (r 1 , r s − 2 , r s , + 1 n + 1 n + 2 −n , n)-TA code for the DM-AIC(p Y |X , p Z|X ).
Proof: First, the message rate is r 1 , the key consumption rate is r s , and the blocklength is n, and the probability of message error is since M = M 1 , K = M s , and the block-length has not changed, and the code has not been changed, respectively. This leaves in question the authentication rate and the authentication fault tolerance. 
where Equation (27) 
where (30) 
proving that the code has typical authentication rate r s − 2 with failure tolerance 1 n + 1 n + 2 −n .
C. Proof of Theorem 11
Proof: First note that there exists a sequence of (0, r n , α n , n , n)-codes for the DM-BCCC(p Y |X , p Z|X ) such that lim n→∞ (r n , α n , n ) = (r, α, 0)
for all r and α
by Corollary 9. Note, we may assume lim n→∞ n = ∞ since it is always possible to inject error into a decoder.
This also implies a sequence of (r n , α n −2 n , α n , n + 1 n + 1 n n +2 −n n , n)-TA codes for the DM-AIC(p Y |X , p Z|X ) where lim n→∞ (r n , α n − 2 n , n + 1 n + 1 n n + 2 −n n ) = (r, α, α),
via Theorem 17. Combining Equation (36) with the operational definitions proves that if
then (r, α, κ) ∈ C TA (p Y |X , p Z|X ).
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In order to prove Theorem 12, it will be necessary to first prove the following theorem. Here, the set of 2 n(κ+2β) secret keys for (f ,φ) will be represented as two smaller secret keys chosen from sets of size 2 nκ and 2 n2β . For each of the secret keys from the set of size 2 n2β , there will exist an injective mapping from the set of messages for (f ,φ) (2 n(r−β) elements) to the set of messages for (f, ϕ) (2 nr elements).
For transmission of a given message using (f ,φ), encoderf acts by applying the injective mapping associated with the secret key from the set of size 2 n2β to the input message, and then using the resulting message and the secret key from the set of size 2 nκ as the input to the original encoder f . On the other end, the decoderφ first applies the decoder ϕ to the received message with appropriate secret key, and then inverts the injective mapping with the appropriate secret key. If the symbol can not be inverted, then deception is declared. Using this scheme, it is immediately clear that the resulting message rate of the code is r − β and the resulting key consumption rate is κ + 2β. This leaves the determination of the authentication rate and probability of error.
The authentication rate and probability of error of (f ,φ) will be put in terms of these same measures for (f, ϕ).
In order to assist the preceding, letZ,M , K 1 , K 2 be the RVs representing Gríma's observation, the message, first secret key, and second secret key of (f ,φ), respectively, while letting Z, M, K be the RVs representing Gríma's observation, the message, and secret key of (f, ϕ), respectively. Furthermore, let correlated RVs (F ,Φ) represent the randomly chosen encoder and decoder.
In appendix B-A, a code construction method is presented which specifies RVs (F ,Φ). With regards to the message error of this code construction,
is shown in Appendix B-B. While for the authentication rate analysis, it is shown in Appendix B-C that with probability greater than
where γ = (4r+2) ln 2 −1+2 ln 2 . Note that there must exist at least one choice of (f ,φ) that satisfies Equation (42) Proof:
A. Code Construction
For a given positive real number β ≤ r, we shall use the following construction to transform codes designed to send messages chosen uniformly from M {1, . . . , 2 nr } with a secret key drawn uniformly from K 1 {1, . . . , 2 nκ }, into codes to send messages chosen uniformly fromM {1, . . . , 2 n(r−β) } with a secret key drawn
The starting codes will be denoted (f, ϕ) ∈ P(X |M, K 1 ) × P(M ∪ {!} |Y, K 1 ), and the resulting code after the transformation will be denoted (f ,φ) ∈ P(X |M, K 1 , K 2 ) × P(M ∪ {!} |Y, K 1 , K 2 ).
Random codebook generation: Independently for each k 2 ∈ K 2 , select a mapping g k2 :M → M uniformly from the set of all injective mappings fromM to M.
Encoders:f
Decoders:φ
B. Message error analysis
The average probability of message error over all possible (f ,φ) is equal to the probability of message error for (f, ϕ). Indeed, this is a direct consequence of
and the fact that the mapping g k2 is chosen uniformly from the set of of all injective mappings. Therefore,
since g k2 is chosen uniformly from the set of all injective mappingsM → M. Now,
directly follows from combining Equation (44) and Markov's inequality.
C. Typical authentication rate analysis
Here, we shall show that
as long as (f ,φ) ∈ G * ∩ G † , where G * is the set of (f ,φ) for which
for all m ∈ M and m ( = m) ∈ M, while G † is the set of (f ,φ) such that
for all m ∈ M. For clarity of presentation, in Appendix B-C1, we show that if (f ,φ) ∈ G † ∩ G * , then Equation (45) holds, and thus if (f ,φ) ∈ G † ∩ G * , then the new code has an authentication rate of α + β − log 2 (γn)/n and an authentication tolerance of 2δ + 1 γn . Next, in Appendix B-C2, we show
and in Appendix B-C3, we show
Thus if β ≥ log 2 (γn)/n, then
follows from Equations (48) and (49) and the union bound. Since 2 −2(n(r+1)−1) < 1 for all n ≥ 2, it proves there must exist at least one (f ,φ) ∈ G † ∩ G * , thus proving the theorem statement.
Proofs of both Equations (48) and (49) will use the following lemma from Csiszár and Körner.
Lemma 19. ( [19, Lemma 17.9 ]) The probability that in k independent trials an event of probability q occurs less/more than αqk times, according as α ≶ 1, is bounded above by e −c(α)qk where c(α) = α ln α − α + 1.
Remark This result implies that if W 1 , . . . , W n are independent Bernoulli random variables and t ≥
1) Typical authentication rate given (f ,φ) ∈ G * ∩ G † : In proving Equation (45) holds for all (f ,φ) ∈ G * ∩ G † , it will be helpful to first prove that
as well as prove that if (f ,φ) ∈ G * , then
First, Equation (51) is a consequence ofX|{M =m, K 1 = k 1 , K 2 = k 2 } being the same as X|{M = g k2 (m), K = k 1 } whenM , M, K 1 , K 2 , K are uniform over their support sets, since then
Next, for all z, m, k 1 , Equation (52) can be derived as follows:
where (53) is because
(m) does not exist. and 2 −nβ (γn) 2 ω f,ϕ (z, m, k 1 ) ≤ ωf ,φ (z, g −1 k2 (m), k 1 , k 2 ) for all k 2 ∈ K * 2 (z, m, k 1 ); (54) is by the definition of function ω; (55) is by the definition of functionφ; (56) is by exchanging the summation basis and recognizing that K * 2 (z, m, k 1 ) ⊆ {k 2 : m ∈ g k2 (M)}; finally (57) is because (f ,φ) ∈ G * and by the definition of ω.
With Equations (51) and (52) in hand, the probability that ωf ,φ (Z,M , K 1 , K 2 ) ≥ 2 −n(α+β−2 log 2 (γn)/n can be upper bounded by putting it in terms of the probability that ω f,ϕ (Z, M, K) ≥ 2 −nα as follows:
z,m,k1,k2: ωf ,φ (z,m,k1,k2)≥2 −n(α+β−2 log 2 (γn)/n) where (58) is because g k2 is an injective mapping and thus the is a single m for each k 2 ,m; (59) is by the earlier observation of (51); (60) follows by summing overm ∈M; (61) follows by splitting the summation terms based upon whether or not ωf ,φ (z, g −1 k2 (m), k 1 , k 2 ) > 2 −nβ (γn) 2 ω f,ϕ (z, m, k 1 ), and then recognizing that 
Of importance is that A k2 and A k 2 are independent for k 2 = k 2 since the mappings G k2 are independently chosen for each k 2 ∈ K 2 . Furthermore,
is uniform over the size 2 n(r−β) subsets of M. As a result of these properties, 
D. Proof of Theorem 12
Proof:
If (r, α, κ) ∈ C TA (p Y |X , p Z|X ), then there exists a sequence of (r n , α n , κ n , δ n , n) codes, (f n , ϕ n ), such that lim n→∞ |(r n , α n , κ n , δ n ) − (r, α, κ, 0)| = 0.
By definition, then, there must exist an n ≥ 3 such that δ n ≤ 5 24 and r n ≥ 2 log 2 γn n where γ = (4r+2) ln 2 −1+2 ln 2 for all n ≥ n . Hence, for any positive β < r, there also exists a sequence of (r n − β n , α n + β n − 2 log 2 γn n , κ n + 2β n , δ n + 2 −n(r+1)−1 + 2δ n + 1 γn , n) codes,
where lim n→∞ β n = β, by Theorem 18. Taking the limit point of this sequence of codes proves that (r − β, α + β, κ + 2β) ∈ C TA (p Y |X , p Z|X ).
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We shall break the proof of Lemma 13 into two parts. In both parts, we shall assume that (f, ϕ) is a (r, α, κ, δ, n)-TA code for DM-AIC(p Y |X , p Z|X ), and then show in Appendix C-A that this requires
for some ζ(δ, n) such that lim δ→0 + n→∞ ζ(δ, n) = 0, and similarly show in Appendix C-B it also requires
for someζ(δ, n) such that lim δ→0 + n→∞ζ (δ, n) = 0. Clearly, having validated Equations (69) and (70), then Lemma 13
will follow by choosing the larger ofζ and ζ as the function presented in the lemma statement.
For the proofs of both Equations (69) and (70), we shall make use of the partitioning random variable, T , constructed in [17] . Discussion on the properties of the random variable can be found in Section III-D. For these proofs we shall use the sequence λ n discussed prior, for which lim n→∞ λ n = 0 and lim n→∞ nλ n = ∞. We shall also introduce a new sequence of error terms, ν n δ + 3 · 2 −nλn , which converge to δ as n → ∞, and furthermore converge to 0 if n → ∞ and δ → 0.
Before moving to proving Equations (69) and (70), we will need to prove the following technical lemma. 
where (71) follows because the probability that (Y, M, K, T ) / ∈ D + is less than 2 −nλn ; (72) is because and (73) is because the probability p(M |K, T ) < 2 −nr+nλn is less than 2 −nλn , the probability of message error must be less than 1 − δ, and r > 2λ n . Next, observe the following upper bound on the expectation of τ (M, K, T );
Combining these two observations and solving for Pr τ (M, K, T ) ≤ 1 − √ ν n proves the lemma statement.
With this technical lemma in hand, we proceed to the proof of Lemma 13.
Proof: 
where D + is the stabilized set discussed in Section III-D, since all summands inside the indicator are positive. But,
for all (y, k, t) ∈ D + . Hence,
by combining Equations (79) and (80). Furthermore,
recalling that ν n δ + 3 · 2 −nλn , by using that
and then applying Lemma 20 to the sum of the 1 τ (m, k, t) < 1 − √ ν n terms.
Equation (82) provides a bound on the number of t for which I(Y; K|T = t) can be less than nα. With this in mind, observe that
where (85) is where Equation (82) is specifically used. Collecting all the vanishing terms in Equation (85) yields 
where (94) follows from Equation (91). Hence, The proof of Theorem 14 is divided into three parts. In Appendix D-A, it will be shown that if positive real numbers satisfy
in Appendix D-B, it will be shown that if (r, α, κ) ∈ C TA (p Y |X , p Z|X ), then there exists X, U, W such that Finally, we shall show in Appendix D-C, that restricting auxiliary random variables U and W so that |U| ≤ (|X | + 1)(|X | + 2) and |W| ≤ |X | + 2 does not reduce the established region. 
B. Converse for Theorem 14
In order for (r, α, κ) to be achievable for DM-AIC(p Y |X , p Z|X ), there must exist a sequence of (r n , α n , κ n , δ n , n)-TA codes, for n = {1, 2, . . . }, such that lim n→∞ |(r n , α n , κ n , δ n ) − (r, α, κ, 0)| = 0.
But, r n + α n ≤ n −1 I(Y; M, K) + ζ(δ n , n) + n −1 + δ n log 2 |Y| (110)
2α n − κ n ≤ n −1 [I(Y; M, K) − I(Z; M, K)] + 2ζ(δ n , n) + n −1 + δ n log 2 |Y| (111) α n − κ n ≤ 0 (112) must hold for a given (r n , α n , κ n , δ n , n)-TA code. Indeed, to prove Equations (110)-(112), first observe the following inequalities for a (r n , α n , κ n , δ n , n)-TA code: 
α − κ ≤ 0.
We now return to proving Equations (118)-(120). This can be done via a trick from the proof of [19, Lemma 15.7] , in which for Y = (Y 1 , . . . , Y n ) and Z = (Z 1 , . . . , Z n ) it is shown that 
C. Auxiliary random variable cardinalities
Finally, we now return to prove that |U| ≤ (|X | + 2)(|X | + 1) and |W| ≤ |X | + 2 in Equations (118)-(120). This can be done via the Fenchel-Eggleston-Carathéodory theorem (see, for example, [22, Appendix A] or [19, Lemma 15.6] ). For completeness, we will prove the bounds using a restricted version of a support lemma from [22, Appendix C]. Note, we enter here a restricted version of the lemma, because the general U and W from Equations (118)-(120) has a finite support set, and thus we have no need to discuss continuous distributions or differential entropy. 
